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I. INTRODUCTION
Emil Lederer (1882–1939) was exposed to diverse inﬂuences. In Vienna he was a
student of Eugen von Bo¨hm-Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, and Eugen von
Philippovich, but ‘‘. . . when Hilferding and Otto Bauer spoke in those Viennese
seminars Lederer must often have taken the side of the Marxists’’ believe Jakob
Marschak et al. (1941, p. 80).1 In Berlin, Lederer attended Gustav Schmoller’s
lectures. His supervisor in Munich, where he received a second doctoral degree,
was Lujo Brentano. Lederer’s habilitation submitted to the University of Heidel-
berg entailed ‘‘the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of the working conditions and
political attitudes of salaried employees’’ (Dickler 1987, p. 157). As much as his
last work, on the State of the Masses, published posthumously in 1940, it was
an important contribution to sociology.2
Lederer’s work in economics reﬂects this rich background. On the one hand,
there are roots in the German historical school with its holistic approach to
economic and social phenomena, but also its meticulous empirical investigations,
detailed collection, and examination of facts. On the other hand Lederer’s roots
are in the Austrian school, stressing theoretical analysis and deductive reasoning.
His theoretical interests go far beyond the neoclassical tradition and extend to
Marxist and classical-Ricardian theory.
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Examples of those roots in quite diﬀerent camps can be found in the literature
Lederer cites in his 1925 article on business cycles: Karl Marx and Rosa
Luxemburg are listed side by side with Joseph A. Schumpeter, Knut Wicksell,
and Gustav Cassel. Authors whose writings are not published in German are
mentioned as well; besides Albert Aftalion and others, special emphasis is given
to the ‘‘English and American literature’’ with John A. Hobson, Thorstein
Veblen, A. C. Pigou, Wesley C. Mitchell, Irving Fisher, and John Maynard
Keynes (Lederer 1925, p. 355). In Aufriss der o¨konomischen Theorie (1931a)
Lederer discusses the labor theory of value and the marginalist price theory both
extensively and critically, and points out the virtues and uses of each.
To sum up, Lederer’s work combines approaches that were at other times the
subject of ﬁerce professional debates and which are often—to this day—presented
as irreconcilable. Therefore it is impossible to ﬁt Lederer into any one school of
thought; he does not conform to expected patterns. In his writings he comes oﬀ
as a fascinating, if idiosyncratic, thinker. He was a versatile writer. Besides
addressing his fellow academics he contributed to newspapers and journals
aimed at a non-academic audience.
Here I focus on Lederer’s contributions to business cycle analysis, which are a
prime illustration of his diverse background. Dickler (1981, p. 267) argues that
Lederer combines ‘‘central ideas of classical political economy and Marx’s theory
of accumulation’’ with ‘‘Schumpeter’s ideas on innovation and credit.’’3 Lederer
supports his theoretical arguments with empirical data, discussions of institu-
tions, and references to recent developments. Therefore, these contributions also
exemplify how Lederer links theoretical reasoning and empirical work.
This paper traces the development of Lederer’s business cycle, crisis, and
growth analysis. The ﬁrst section discusses the explanation put forward in 1925
in ‘‘Konjunktur und Krisen’’ (Grundriss der Sozialo¨konomie). In the second
section, two further works are analyzed that can be understood as extensions of
the analysis presented in 1925. In his article of 1927, ‘‘Monopole und Konjunk-
tur,’’ Lederer expands an aspect already mentioned in 1925. In Technical progress
and unemployment (1931b), which was revised and extended for the International
Labour Oﬃce’s Studies and Reports series (1938) Lederer analyzes crises in the
context of labor-saving technical progress. In section III, the reception of
Lederer’s contributions is discussed. Among other aspects addressed are the
dramatic change in Lederer’s research environment through emigration and the
shift in macroeconomic analysis brought about by Keynes’s General Theory.
II. LEDERER’S BUSINESS CYCLE EXPLANATION OF 1925 IN
‘‘KONJUNKTUR UND KRISEN’’
Lederer builds on a distinction between consumer goods, i.e., goods for ﬁnal
consumption, and investment or producer goods. For an analysis of the circular
ﬂow within the economy Lederer (1925, p. 368) extends the Marxian schemes of
reproduction to include six social groups, according to their diﬀerent economic
3All translations are mine.
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functions: There are entrepreneurs and workers in the industrial sector, and there
are farmers and agricultural workers. They produce output and thus create
income. To these four, Lederer adds groups ﬁve and six—public employees and
of rentiers, respectively. In contrast to the former four, these latter groups receive
their incomes as transfers from the productive sectors. Most importantly their
incomes are ﬁxed in long-term contracts, i.e., they do not ﬂuctuate in nominal
terms during the business cycle as do proﬁts and wages.4
Lederer (1925, pp. 371–76) takes a lot of care to bring out the distinction
between disturbances in the circular ﬂow and phenomena of the business cycle.
Disturbances in the circular ﬂow are inconsistencies between supply and demand
for individual goods or for the output of the consumer and producer goods
sectors respectively. They result from misjudgements of demand developments
by producers, from good or bad harvests, etc. They do not lead to crises though:
price adjustments induce a redistribution of purchasing power between income
groups and a redirection of demand. Capacity reserves and stocks of goods
allow the supply side to adjust to such disturbances. In other words, Say’s law
of markets is at work.5
Such disturbances in the circular ﬂow cannot explain periodic crises, however;
for this Lederer turns to the explanation of cyclical phenomena. A descriptive
analysis of the business cycle is followed by a discussion of its causes and of
possible remedies, and that is where we turn next. The depression, which Lederer
describes as a ‘‘static state’’ (1925, p. 361), is overcome through an increase in
eﬀective demand. As a consequence of this impulse, prices increase. This is made
possible by an increase in the velocity of circulation and more importantly by
‘‘additional credit’’ as distinct from a mere transfer of savings. It is additional
credit that makes a boom possible: savings are invested in all phases of the cycle.6
Money and credit are thus essential although monetary factors are not seen as
initiating the cycle. To the extent that stocks and spare capacity are available,
output will begin to rise as well. Prices do not increase evenly across all sectors of
the economy: less competitive industries, especially in primary goods production,
will experience larger price increases than competitive industries in ﬁnal goods.
Wages will rise more slowly than prices, as wage contracts usually cover longer
terms. Lederer supports this argument by the empirical observation that proﬁts
4The position of shareholders is somewhere in between: Lederer (1925, p. 401) expects dividends to
rise less than proﬁts in the boom.
5Lederer (1925, p. 374) qualiﬁes this statement in an argument reminiscent of Clower’s dual-decision-
hypothesis: in the case of an exceptionally good harvest with a signiﬁcant fall in agricultural prices,
the income losses of the agricultural population may not be compensated by the increases in their
customers’ purchasing power. The reduced demand from the agricultural sector as a result of reduced
income may lead to a general crisis. Lederer insists that this is not the normal course of events;
usually equilibrium is restored by market forces.
6As interest rates increase with an increased demand for credit, a selection of the most proﬁtable
production possibilities takes place. This positive eﬀect is potentially overruled by a problem inherent
in a fragmented competitive banking system: too large a proportion of credits could ﬂow into
seemingly promising industries. Lederer (1925, p. 384) argues that this danger will be reduced as the
‘‘self-organization’’ of the capitalist economy increases: the more concentrated the banking industry
and thus the granting of credit is, ‘‘. . . the more reason to expect an appropriate allotment of
additional credit.’’
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rise in this phase of the business cycle. To make the increase possible, at least one
cost component must increase less than prices. If goods prices rise in all sectors,
even if to varying degrees, it is necessary that wages grow more slowly to allow
proﬁts to rise across the economy.
As a result, the increase in the wage bill will lag behind the increase in the
value of production. The share of wages in the social product will fall, and the
share of proﬁts will increase. Since Lederer (1925, p. 393) assumes that wages
are predominantly spent on consumption and proﬁts are predominantly invested,
this implies an alteration in the composition of demand. With rising proﬁts and
accumulation, demand for producer goods rises, whereas demand for ﬁnal
products lags behind.7 Investment goods industries grow faster than consumer
goods production. The unbalanced growth reﬂects the uneven development of
diﬀerent types of income though. Therefore such disproportions are fundamen-
tally diﬀerent from the disproportions discussed above. The former result from
unexpected changes in supply or demand, implying an allocation not correspond-
ing to purchasing power. Here, in contrast, it is purchasing power that directs
the development into disproportion. From the perspective of ﬁrms, the allocation
is optimal (Lederer 1925, p. 394). That it is unsustainable from a macroeconomic
perspective though will become obvious towards the end of the boom.
The disproportional development of incomes implies that the capacities built
up in producer goods industries are excessive. The demand for consumption
goods is inadequate in the sense that it does not call for an extension of the
production facilities in this sector, an extension that would be imperative to keep
up the demand for investment goods. This ‘‘discrepancy between the development
of production and income’’ (Lederer 1925, p. 386) underlies the upper turning
point of the cycle. Although the income development, and thus the diﬀerential
increase in demand, has driven accumulation, the build-up in investment goods
industries has been too fast. Under these circumstances the ‘‘realization of
proﬁts’’ is not possible for all investments (Lederer 1925, p. 394). This will reduce
spending. Demand begins to fall oﬀ, goods remain unsold. The downturn begins
with ‘‘uncertainty in the market’’ (Lederer 1925, p. 363), usually in conjunction
with a credit contraction. As interest rates rise, costs increase for those ﬁrms
who relied on credit ﬁnancing for their additional investment.
Lederer points out that the reduction in demand may ﬁrst appear in any sector
of the economy, although he concedes that in recent cycles the crises ﬁrst emerged
in heavy industries. Where the reduction in demand is felt ﬁrst does not inﬂuence
the course of events.8 The eﬀects will be carried from ﬁrm to ﬁrm as demand is
curtailed, prices and proﬁts fall, output is reduced, and capital values have to be
adjusted.9 The crisis is the prelude to depression, the economy returns to a static
state without new investment. During the depression, income shares are reverted
7This process is supported by forced saving, which results not only from the slow adjustment of
wages but also from ﬁxed incomes of public employees and rentiers (Lederer 1925, p. 383).
8The same is true for the increases in demand that start the boom.
9Lederer (1925, p. 367) points out that rising prices in the boom and falling prices in the depression
cause consumers to behave procyclically. In the boom they increase their stocks to avoid further
price increases. Once prices begin to fall in the downturn they postpone purchases in order to beneﬁt
from falling prices.
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as prices fall faster than wages. Proﬁts are reduced and the purchasing power of
wages and, in particular of ﬁxed incomes, is increased. This is reﬂected in the
composition of aggregate demand; production adjusts accordingly.
Lederer (1925, p. 390) allows for exogenous causes of business cycles, he
mentions increased export demand, e.g., from a country introducing a railway
system or importing war materials. But more importantly, he describes the
business cycle as an endogenous movement of a growing economy that does not
need any impulses from outside (Lederer 1925, p. 403). In the depression the
increased purchasing power of ﬁxed-income recipients stabilizes demand, depletes
stocks, and leads to an increase in production, starting the upswing. In much
the same way the reduction in purchasing power of this part of national income
during the boom eventually leads to a downturn and to depression. Price
movements are a necessary part of the business cycle. They induce the uneven
development of income streams, which cause the ﬂuctuations in economic
activity. Here the importance of Lederer’s extension of the Marxian reproduction
schemes becomes clear: the added groups of ﬁxed income recipients are central
to his business cycle explanation. As much in the boom as in the depression,
ﬁxed incomes act as stabilizers of disproportional developments.10
The business cycle is seen as an integral part of the (capitalist) economic
process by Lederer (1925, p. 368), who references Schumpeter on this point.
Even as the static state of depression is reached at the end of the business cycle
and the level of economic activity is reduced as compared to the preceding
boom, the social product will have increased from one depression to the next
(Lederer 1925, p. 383). From his analysis Lederer (1925, p. 413) concludes that
cyclical ﬂuctuations in economic activity could only be avoided in a planned
economy. A continuous and even expansion of the production capacity and the
adjustment to changed demands and technological possibilities would require
planning.
Exactly what Lederer envisions when he suggests planning is not addressed in
his contribution on business cycles in 1925. Conceptions of a planned economy
are discussed in detail in his 1932 book. Lederer contends that ‘‘Every planned
economy must aim for entirety—it includes an aspect of totality as everything is
10Fixed income recipients are central to Tugan-Baranovsky’s explanation of the ‘‘industrial cycle’’
in his study of industrial crises in England (Tugan-Baranovsky 1901, pp. 232–54). Tugan was the
ﬁrst author to develop a business cycle theory from Marx’s reproduction analysis. Although Lederer
builds on this aspect of Tugan’s writings (Lederer cites him in the literature list and mentions him
in his notes on the history of business cycle explanations), their theories are fundamentally diﬀerent.
Lederer’s business cycle is driven by demand: consumption spending out of ﬁxed incomes stabilizes
the economy in the depression and eventually leads to recovery. In Tugan the importance of ﬁxed
incomes lies in the continuous provision of savings during the business cycle. In the depression this
leads to an accumulation of loanable funds; these will eventually induce renewed investment and
thus lead to an expansion. Tugan-Baranovsky illustrates this line of thought by comparing the
accumulation of loanable funds with the building up of steam pressure in a steam engine. This
argument is explicitly rejected by Lederer who maintains that savings are fully invested in all phases
of the business cycle (1925, pp. 377–78, n. 1). Lederer’s demand-driven vision of the business cycle
contrasts with Tugan’s classical view: ‘‘It is not consumption that determines production in the
capitalist economy, instead it is production that determines consumption’’ (Tugan-Baranovsky 1901,
p. 253).
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steered towards a system of production for the purposes of consumption’’ (1932,
p. 35). Nonetheless he argues that ‘‘Free and planned economies are opposites
only in principle, but they do not exclude each other in reality’’ (1932, p. 9). He
discusses the possibility of sectors with market coordination in a planned
economy and examples of planned sectors in market economies such as water
supply, the road system, and the public school system. In short, when Lederer
suggests planning as a solution to ﬂuctuations, this does not imply the elimination
of markets. Lederer envisions macroeconomic planning to prevent dispropor-
tional developments that result from forecasting errors of proﬁt-oriented indi-
vidual decisions.
In a capitalist system, intertemporal coordination failures are pervasive since
individually proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms are incapable of avoiding mistakes provoked
by misleading price signals. The ensuing sectoral imbalances are corrected in the
disruptions of a crisis, resulting in the destruction of wealth and in unemploy-
ment. In a capitalist economy, business cycles are a necessary part of development
and growth. Therefore Lederer questions the suggestion of stabilizing the value
of money as a remedy for business cycles. He doubts that an economy with
monetary stability could grow as fast as an economy with ﬂuctuating value of
money: ‘‘To achieve fast growth a capitalist economy needs the incentive of
extraordinary proﬁt’’ (Lederer 1925, p. 413).
Considering all of this, it is not surprising that Lederer rejects most contempo-
rary suggestions for stabilizing the economy as either ineﬀective or undesirable.
The crisis is necessary for eliminating the disproportionalities in the production
sphere that develop during the boom; the depression has to run its course.
Therefore credit creation in the depression would only lead to inﬂation as long
as the necessary adjustments have not taken place (Lederer 1925, p. 406). In
theory a redistribution of income from proﬁt to wage recipients could prevent
a crisis resulting from the disproportional development of income shares
(Lederer 1925, p. 401). However, wage increases in the downturn would be
opposed to ﬁrms’ endeavors to reduce costs and postpone necessary corrections
in the production sphere. Moreover, wage increases would run counter to the
deﬂation that is necessary in a depression to reverse the inﬂationary excesses
of the boom. However, Lederer (1925, p. 403) welcomes trade unions’ resistance
to wage reductions in the depression, as stabilized wages will help stabilize
demand for consumption goods.11 This is also the eﬀect of public works and
other support for the unemployed, motivated by the aim of alleviating the
hardship of workers.
Forms of government spending that go beyond such a limited extent are
rejected by Lederer (1925, p. 407). He explicitly mentions bond-ﬁnanced govern-
ment spending on war materials. Even though this would allow production and
income generation, which would otherwise not take place during the crisis, it is
undesirable. Lederer’s case does not rest on Ricardian equivalence though.
Assuming government spending to be consumptive, he argues with the growth
eﬀects of reduced investment: the placement of government bonds absorbs
11Wages need to fall in the depression, but they should fall less rapidly than prices. Otherwise the
crisis will be deepened.
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savings at the time of issue. Tax-ﬁnanced debt services again employ savings. In
other words, Lederer assumes that taxes primarily reduce savings and private
investment, and not consumption as a Keynesian consumption function view
would suggest. Lederer thus points out the reduction in capital accumulation
and growth potential that would result from bond-ﬁnanced government spending.
In sum, although Lederer emphasizes insuﬃcient aggregate demand during the
crisis, he does not recommend demand stabilization in a Keynesian manner.
Diebolt’s (1997, p. 43) interpretation that Keynesian economic policy conclusions
follow logically from Lederer’s theory must be rejected.
The topic of Lederer’s (1927) contribution on business cycles, the eﬀect of
cartels, is already brieﬂy discussed in his 1925 article (Lederer 1925, pp. 409–11).
Cartels or organized industries deserve attention in the discussion of business
cycles as their importance has increased in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Cartelized industries can protect their proﬁts from the eﬀects of crises
by stabilizing prices. But this will lead to transfers of purchasing power from
other sectors of the economy and intensify the crisis there. In short, the
advantages the organized sector can draw for itself are compensated by disadvan-
tages in other sectors. There are no positive eﬀects for the economy as a whole,
and the depression might even be worsened in this case. The next step in Lederer’s
argument is to ask whether the organization of the entire economy on the basis
of cartels could limit the eﬀects of business cycles. Price reductions in the crisis
could be precluded by reduced quantities, the ﬂuctuation of proﬁts and of prices
would be dampened. But this would foreclose the increase in consumption
resulting from the price elasticity of demand, and the impulse for a new upswing
would be dampened also. The depression would be prolonged.
Lederer (1925, p. 412) expects the institutionalization of central banks, a
process he describes as taking place in Europe and the U.S. at the time, to be
the ‘‘most eﬀective way’’ to control and dampen the business cycle. The regulation
of overall credit creation on the one hand, an overview over economy-wide
lending on the other, would allow the system to avoid the excessive increases in
credit creation and the over-ﬁnancing of seemingly promising sectors that occur
in a competitive banking industry.12 As mentioned earlier (see n. 6) Lederer
expects similar eﬀects from an organized banking industry following its own
proﬁt interests. Both developments would introduce an element of macro-
economic planning: information on sectoral growth that individual investors
could not obtain would become available to the banks. Credit policy based on
this information would allow more realistic appraisals of proﬁtability and could
thus help prevent disproportional developments.
Lederer’s Austrian heritage is conspicuous in his business cycle explanation,
especially in his explicit following of Schumpeter in core areas of the argument
and in several references to Schumpeter’s work. Among them the following are
essential: the central importance of credit in ﬁnancing the boom, the discussion
of disproportional developments in the producer and consumer goods sectors in
the course of the business cycle, and the function of crisis and depression in
correcting the misallocations of the boom. In both the contemporary Austrian
12This idea is presented in more detail in Lederer (1932, pp. 16–33).
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and Lederer’s writings, unemployment is mentioned only in passing. The disrup-
tion that economic growth suﬀers from the business cycle and not the eﬀects in
labor markets is at the center of attention. This change in emphasis in the
theoretical literature would have to wait until the overwhelming unemployment
of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The role of monetary factors in Lederer’s business cycle analysis can be clariﬁed
against the background of Ellis’s classiﬁcations in German monetary theory
1905–1933 (1934, pp. 315–74). Lederer’s argument shares many aspects of the
‘‘Schumpeter-Hahn type of cycle theory’’ as opposed to the ‘‘Mises-Hayek analy-
sis of cycles’’ and the ‘‘Other exponents of credit theories’’ which add to Mises
and Hayek’s critique of the ﬁrst group of authors (Ellis 1934, p. 357). Schumpeter
and Albert L. Hahn develop theories where business cycles are tightly linked to
monetary phenomena. The expansionary phase, though set oﬀ by innovative ﬁrms,
is accompanied by expanded credit. This credit creation is productive in the sense
that it is ‘‘the most expeditious way of bringing technical advances to economic
fruition’’ (Ellis 1934, p. 316). Cycles are thus seen in an optimistic light as integral
part of the growth process. This view is vehemently rejected by their critics, led by
Ludwig vonMises and Friedrich A. von Hayek. Ellis argues that in their pessimis-
tic perspective cycles disturb the growth process and are thus a hindrance to
development. The incorporation of technical changes would be best achieved in
an environment of falling prices corresponding to falling costs of production
(Ellis 1934, p. 316). Such circumstances would also allow continuous equilibrium
between investment and savings. Schumpeter and Hahn stress that low interest
rates bring about a credit expansion and facilitate growth (Ellis 1934, p. 318).
In contrast, Mises and Hayek focus on inadequate money and credit supply,
emphasizing quantity rather than price (Ellis 1934, p. 338).
Lederer’s argument as presented above clearly sides with Schumpeter’s and
Hahn’s outlook. Like them, Lederer underlines the role of low interest rates in
facilitating investment during the expansion. He underlines the cyclical character
of the growth process in capitalist economies and, again, together with Schum-
peter and Hahn, rejects the view that eliminating cycles would enhance long-
term growth. Furthermore, Lederer describes the monetary disturbance during
the upswing as a matter of inadequate interest rates rather than an inadequate
volume of money and credit.
Whereas we have now drawn attention to similarities between Lederer and
some of the Austrian writers (in contrast to others among them), we now turn
to aspects where Lederer’s views are opposed to a shared position of the Austrian
authors. Schumpeter’s upswing begins with the appearance of entrepreneurs
implementing innovations. In the over-investment theories of Mises and Hayek
a misconceived interest rate policy induces ﬁrms to invest in more roundabout
methods of production. In both branches of Austrian business cycle explanations
the impulse for the expansion comes from the supply side. It is ﬁrms that act. In
Lederer, ﬁrms react: they perceive an increase in eﬀective demand and expand
their activities accordingly. The same is true for the beginning of the crisis: in
Lederer insuﬃcient demand leads to a reduction in supply, whereas in the
Austrian authors supply conditions change with the increase in interest rates and
set oﬀ the contraction in the production sphere.
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There is another central issue where Lederer diverges from the Austrians: he
does not develop a concept of intertemporal equilibrium with coinciding natural
and market interest rates. Whereas in Austrian theories an intertemporal equilib-
rium describes an allocation in congruence with time preferences and production
possibilities in the economy, there is no corresponding equilibrium concept in
Lederer. He does not discuss explicitly what deﬁnes the appropriate proportions
in the production sphere and the corresponding income shares to be restored
in crisis and depression. Considering Lederer’s later writings, especially on
technological unemployment, it can be assumed though that production technol-
ogy provides these conditions. If production processes are seen as relatively
inﬂexible concerning the input of labor and capital at any point in time, and if
technology is presumed to be fairly unresponsive to relative factor prices but
mostly exogenous, then the growth path is deﬁned in real terms for both income
shares and corresponding sectoral developments. Lederer’s rejection of wage
increases or credit-ﬁnanced public spending to prevent a crisis and prolong the
boom by creating demand can be explained with this background. Furthermore,
Lederer’s discussion of the eﬀects of these measures emphasizes their impact on
long-term growth perspectives, a theme that will gain in importance in his later
work.
III. EXTENSIONS
Monopolies (1927)
In his 1927 contribution to business cycle theory, Lederer discusses the eﬀects of
cartels and trusts on the business cycle. He uses the distinction between static and
dynamic analysis, a distinction that would receive more attention in his later work
(1931a, 1931b, 1938). Here, Lederer (1927, p. 20) describes a static vision of the
economy (‘‘statisches Bild der Wirtschaft’’) as including both the cases of a static
or stationary and an evenly progressing economy (‘‘harmonisch fortschreitende
Wirtschaft’’).13 In a dynamic context ‘‘development changes all data incessantly
and in fact unevenly’’ (Lederer 1927, p. 20). Technical progress leads to growth
and is necessarily linked to ﬂuctuations, an insight we have already encountered
in Lederer’s 1925 article as discussed above.
The analysis of cartels and trusts under static conditions builds on an
elaboration of the arguments ﬁrst made by Lederer in 1925 (as discussed above).
It leads him (1927, p. 16) to state a paradox: monopolies achieve above-average
proﬁts by reducing output below competitive levels. At the same time these high
proﬁts are an incentive for additional investment, which would increase future
output and potentially undermine the above average proﬁtability. ‘‘Whenever
13 In his later writings the ‘‘evenly progressing economy’’ is subsumed under dynamic analysis
(Lederer 1931a, p. 97); see the discussion below. The distinction reﬂects Cassel’s in Theoretische
Sozialo¨konomie though he uses slightly diﬀerent terms (Cassel 1919, p. 23) on ‘‘Die stationa¨re
Wirtschaft’’ (pp. 27–29), on ‘‘Die gleichma¨ssig fortschreitende Wirtschaft,’’ and (p. 455) where Cassel
argues ‘‘Auf diesem Wege fu¨hrt das Studium der Konjunkturen zu einer Dynamik der Volkswirt-
schaft, die der fru¨heren Behandlung des Wirtschaftslebens als einer stillstehenden Erscheinung oder
als einer gleichfo¨rmigen Entwicklung als unerla¨ssliche Erga¨nzung dienen soll.’’
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increased proﬁts accrue continuously and are accumulated continuously, an
increase in production and consumption, moreover an accelerated increase in
consumption, will have to follow if the destruction of the value of the accumulated
capital is to be avoided’’ (Lederer 1927, pp. 16–17). This paradox continues to
exist in dynamic conditions, but the extent of contradiction varies in the course
of the business cycle. In the boom period high proﬁts allow investments to keep
pace with the growth in demand, and accumulation is possible without recourse
to the credit market. If several industries in the economy are monopolized this
may lead to accelerated growth in the upswing and an earlier crisis than under
competitive conditions. In the depression the eﬀect of monopolies is to slow
down the adjustment processes. As prices do not fall as fast and to the same
extent as in competitive industries, the depression is prolonged. The overall eﬀect
of cartelization on the business cycle is thus negative, a conclusion Lederer had
already reached in his 1925 article.
Lederer considers basic industries to be highly organized.14 He argues that a
return to competitive conditions in these sectors is unlikely given modern
production technology. Because of enormous ﬁxed costs, large-scale production
is advantageous. Under such technical conditions business cycles become ‘‘ever
more dangerous’’ (Lederer 1927, p. 32) from a ﬁrm’s perspective, as ﬂexibility in
adjusting production is lost. ‘‘No doubt this so far little considered eﬀect of
technical progress is one of the main reasons for the conspicuous enthusiasm of
practical men for stabilizing the business cycle if possible’’ (Lederer 1927,
p. 27). From his discussion of the eﬀects of monopolies Lederer concludes that
stabilization would only be possible in a planned economy. Regulation through
credit policy—which Lederer had seen as an important means to control and
dampen ﬂuctuations in his analysis of 1925—is ineﬀective in monopolized
industries that rely predominantly on investment ﬁnancing from own sources
and can therefore circumvent credit markets.
Technical Progress and Unemployment (1931b/1938)
In the preface to the ﬁrst edition of Technischer Fortschritt und Arbeitslosigkeit,
Lederer (1931b, pp. iv–v) sums up the conclusions of his analysis in plain
language. They are far-reaching, rather radical conclusions: Lederer makes
technical progress responsible for large-scale and long-term unemployment in
the wake of a boom period. Technical progress is ‘‘too fast’’ if the relationship
between capital accumulation and population growth does not allow the inte-
gration of all workers into the production process, given the new capital-intensive
technology. Moreover, the tendency towards cartelization speeds up technical
progress and leads to increased unemployment in depressions. Technical progress
has ‘‘devastating eﬀects,’’ all the more so the more successfully it increases
production capacity. Lederer concludes that restraining technical change is a
matter of survival for the European nations. In the revised edition published in
14Concentration and cartelization in basic industries increased considerably in interwar Germany
(James 1986, 122–25).
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1938 by the International Labor Oﬃce, Lederer is much more restrained. To the
original title, Technical progress and unemployment, the subtitle An enquiry into
the obstacles to economic expansion is added. Lederer extends the analysis
substantially (the volume has more than 260 pages, versus 126 pages of the ﬁrst
edition), clariﬁes his position, and leaves it up to the reader to draw conclusions.
The radical rhetoric that surfaces here and there in 1931 has disappeared
altogether in the second edition, although the core of the argument is unchanged.
Important developments lie between the two editions of the book. Hitler’s
assumption of power forced Lederer into emigration. Esslinger (1997) analyzes
the inﬂuence of these experiences on Lederer’s work and argues that familiarity
with the economy of the United States changed Lederer’s vision of the eﬀects of
technical progress. He stresses the abundance and variance in goods supplied
and the high degree of mechanization in their production on the one hand, the
fabric of American society as diﬀering from the European on the other. Under
these impressions the potential of unemployment and waste of resources entailed
in labor-saving technical progress seems to have lost some of the threat that is
stressed in Lederer’s early analysis. As a consequence, the planned economy,
oﬀered as a solution to overly rapid technical change in 1931b, is used only as a
benchmark for the evaluation of government policies in a capitalistic economy
in 1938 (Esslinger 1997, p. 369).
Apart from the importance of his experiences, Lederer’s thinking on the
subject of Technical progress and unemployment developed in the intervening
years, not least in reaction to the debate that his contribution generated. His
ﬁrst book was clearly meant as a provocation for debate and further analyses of
the subject. In the introduction to Technischer Fortschritt und Arbeitslosigkeit,
Lederer cautions that his work so far represents only the beginning of ‘‘a ﬁrst
attempt at an analysis’’ and he adds that its ‘‘continuation and deepening would
be very desirable’’ (Lederer 1931b, p. iv). Considering the topical nature of
Lederer’s book in the context of the Great Depression and his far-reaching
conclusions concerning economic policy as much as economic theory, it is not
surprising that the reactions were resolute. Nicholas Kaldor’s scathing review
essay, ‘‘A Case Against Technical Progress?’’ was published in Economica in
1932.15 In the following year Mentor Bouniatian wrote on ‘‘Technical Progress
and Unemployment’’ in the International Labour Review. Both authors build
their rejection of Lederer’s views on arguments based on neoclassical static
equilibrium theory. Central to both articles is the critique of Lederer’s vision of
technical progress as unrepresentative for technical change in general. Further-
more both authors reject Lederer’s pessimism concerning adjustment mechanisms
leading the economy back to full employment.
The following discussion focuses on those aspects of Lederer’s thinking on
technical progress, as presented in the 1938 version of Technical Progress and
Unemployment, that are central to our analysis of the development of his business
cycle theory. The evolution of his thinking on technical change though worthy
of a discussion in its own right, will be considered only in passing. Several
detailed discussions that Lederer added in the second edition can be seen as a
15Dickler (1981, pp. 287–94) discusses and criticizes Kaldor’s review in detail.
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response to the misunderstandings that permeated the reception of the ﬁrst
edition of his book. The clariﬁcation concerning the type of technical change
that Lederer analyzes is a case in point, as much as his extensive discussion of
the nature of dynamic analysis as contrasted with static equilibrium theory. In
the second edition of Technical Progress and Unemployment Lederer introduces
careful deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations, uses numerical examples in his argument,
branches out into the distinction of various cases under diﬀerent assumptions,
and presents statistical evidence.
It is important to understand that Lederer (1938, p. 22) concentrates on cost
saving technical or organizational progress, i.e., rationalization. He distinguishes
this type of technical change from innovations that result in additional demand
by provoking additional needs and from innovations that lead to the replacement
of existing goods and services.16 Railroads are his favorite example of the former
type of technical changes, the car of the latter. Innovations that result in
additional demand are impulses for increased production in the same way as a
permanent rise in export demand. Innovations that replace existing products
imply a restructuring of production, which may lead to frictions in the adjustment
process but not to lasting unemployment. In contrast to both these types of
technical progress, rationalization and an increased organic composition of
capital are detrimental to growth and lead to large-scale unemployment. This is
how Lederer (1938, p. 22) explains the unemployment in the interwar period.17
Technical progress in this sense is the topic of Lederer’s book.
Building on his earlier work, Lederer (1938, pp. 78–90) stresses the distinction
between a static model as a purely theoretical abstraction, a model of the evenly
growing economy and a theory of a truly dynamic system. Dynamic conditions
that are absent in a static model are introduced by a combination of the following
characteristics: the ‘‘dynamic psychology on the part of individual economic
subjects’’ (Lederer 1938, p. 86), i.e., their desire to improve living conditions by
a growing population, by technical change, and by a ﬂexible monetary system.
Without technical change an evenly progressing system can result. But the
existing capitalist economy is characterized by technical changes that continu-
ously introduce disruptions. In these circumstances, Lederer rejects the theoretical
vision of an economy always tending toward a given equilibrium or equilibrium
growth path. Instead, Lederer (1938, p. 92) suggests the analysis of dynamic
systems as comprising a tendency that corrects disruptions and prevents the
system from falling apart, provided that the volume of production is increasing.
These deliberations also imply that ‘‘The discussion of the process of growth in
16Lederer introduces this distinction in his response to Bouniatian’s critique in 1933 (pp. 4–7).
In his contribution to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences on ‘‘technology,’’ Lederer argues that
technological development is the basis for the increased living standards in all parts of society since
the industrial revolution. In this article he develops a much broader perspective on technology than
in his contributions to economic theory, discussing for example the repercussions of changes in
production on society and in politics (Lederer 1934, e.g., p. 556).
17Lederer is not alone in interpreting the boom of the 1920s as linked to rationalization investment
and the following crisis as its result. The issue of whether contemporary unemployment consists of
workers made redundant by technical progress is also a central theme of the economists around
Adolph Lo¨we in Kiel (Hagemann 1997, pp. 304, 312).
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our capitalist economic system is identical with the discussion of the business
cycle in general’’ (Lederer 1938, p. 92), conﬁrming his approach of 1925.
Lederer analyzes aspects of unemployment, accumulation, and technical pro-
gress under simplifying assumptions. First, he discusses the ability of a dynamic
system to absorb unemployed workers irrespective of the causes of the unemploy-
ment, abstracting from reserves and assuming constant prices.18 He analyzes the
cases of increasing and falling returns to scale under the conditions of competitive
and monopolistic markets respectively. In all cases he concentrates on the
possibility of employing additional workers by investing proﬁts according to
current technical conditions. Lederer is interested in the development of ‘‘employ-
ment capacity’’ (‘‘Arbeiterfassungsraum’’ in the German language edition of
1938).
Next, Lederer (1938, pp. 168 ﬀ.) discusses the eﬀects of labor saving technical
changes in a speciﬁc industry (the dynamic sector) where other sectors continue
to apply the original production technology (static sector). He uses numerical
examples to follow investment, employment, and output across his model
economy.19 Unemployment results as primary unemployment in the ﬁrst round
of the introduction of labor saving technology if output is held constant. As
capital is drawn from the static sector due to higher proﬁts in the rationalizing
sector, production is reduced there: secondary unemployment ensues (Lederer
1938, p. 179).
Lederer discusses the ability of the system to reintegrate these workers. He
rejects the optimism of static analysis that unemployed workers will be easily
absorbed as proﬁts and investments increase and wages fall. Crucial to this
argument is Lederer’s rejection of a concept of ‘‘jelly’’ capital already spelled out
in Aufriss der o¨konomischen Theorie (1931a, p. 261). Capital, once invested in
production processes, cannot be ﬂexibly adjusted to more or less labor-intensive
uses. Only new investment conforms to fallen wages, implying a lower capital-
to-labor ratio. Therefore wage reductions in the depression cannot eliminate
unemployment. They are of limited eﬀect in a macroeconomic perspective.2021
Similarly, Lederer (1938, pp. 214 ﬀ.) argues that ‘‘preemptive’’ wage reductions,
i.e., wage reductions with the aim of making labor-saving technical changes
unproﬁtable, are unrealistic. He substantiates this with statistical data on the
electric lamp industry, the automobile tire industry, and the United States Postal
Service.
The core of Lederer’s analysis is the discussion of the ability of the economy
18Lederer (1938, pp. 93–94) stresses that reserves in all forms—overcapacity, stocks, liquidity, the
ability to resort to credit on the side of producers, to money and to permanent consumer goods on
the side of consumers—mitigate the eﬀects of disturbances.
19Dickler (1981, 1983) draws on this analysis when formulating a ‘‘Lederer stagnation theorem.’’
20This point is also made in Lederer (1931c) where he substantiates the case with an analysis of the
speciﬁc conditions in Germany during the Great Depression. Lederer adds other arguments against
wage reductions, for a discussion see Hagemann (2000, pp. 36–41).
21Diebolt (1997, p. 42) argues that for Lederer ‘‘Like for J.M. Keynes, the unemployment persists
not because of excessive wage demands but because of the insuﬃciency of eﬀective demand . . .’’
Insuﬃcient demand is only part of the reason for persistent unemployment in Lederer. More impor-
tant is the reduction of employment opportunities resulting from labor-saving technical change when
capital accumulation is not fast enough, a problem that cannot be cured by wage reductions.
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to absorb workers made redundant by labor-saving technical change. Thus he
takes up the issues raised in Ricardo’s chapter ‘‘On machinery,’’ wherein a
stationary equilibrium of circular ﬂows is disrupted by the introduction of
machinery, reducing the amount of variable capital, i.e., the funds available to
pay wages. Lederer traces similar processes in his analysis. He is interested in
developments outside an equilibrium growth path, providing what John R. Hicks
(1965, p. 184; 1973, p. 81) was later to call an analysis of traverse. This approach
to issues of growth is quite distinct from what might be called the mainstream
of growth theory in the twentieth century. There the possibility of equilibrium
growth paths is in the center of attention with questions such as: under what
conditions does an economy advance in equilibrium? Is the growth path stable
in the sense that deviations generate adjustments that lead the economy back
into equilibrium? This fundamental diﬀerence distinguishes Lederer’s analysis
from a Harrod-Domar approach although central tenets are shared—especially
the limitational production technology as a source of potentially increasing
unemployment. Where Harrod-Domar style growth theory focuses on the condi-
tions of equilibrium growth, Lederer questions the relevance of such analysis. If
growth processes are prone to being interrupted by changes that lead not only
to temporary deviations from a given path but to changes in the path itself, then
the main attention should be directed towards developments initiated by such
interruptions. Lederer uses a sectoral approach where he distinguishes static and
dynamic sectors. He is interested in changes in relative prices, in factor realloca-
tions due to changed proﬁt conditions, etc. These issues cannot be captured in
an aggregate model of the Harrod-Domar type.
The ﬁnal extension (chapters vi and vii) in Lederer’s discussion in Technical
Progress and Unemployment is to introduce a modern banking system and thus
allow for credit-ﬁnanced investment. This integrates the present analysis of
rationalization investment into Lederer’s earlier business cycle theory. By introdu-
cing a monetary system investment is not limited by savings (proﬁts) any more.
The investment triggered by technical change now initiates a credit expansion and
an inﬂationary boom. Initially unemployment can be avoided: the workers that
were laid oﬀ as a result of rationalization are integrated into the growing economy.
These aspects of Lederer’s argument leadGourvitch (1940, p. 171) to conclude that
Lederer’s analysis is ‘‘closely attached to Schumpeter’s because of his emphasis on
credit expansion as the method of providing capital for the innovating enterprise,
on the ensuing ‘race for means of production,’ and on the eﬀects of the resulting
boom in disguising and deferring the displacement of labor through technological
improvements.’’ This disguise of the ultimate eﬀects of labor-saving technical pro-
gress is lifted once the reserves of the banking system are exhausted or once ﬁrms
begin to repay credits out of proﬁts or savings. Investment demand falls; the
monetary contraction causes the recessionary impulse to spread through the entire
economy. Unemployment results. Again, Lederer stresses that wage reductions
will not clear the labor markets. To the reasoning presented above, he now adds
the argument that wage reductions will further reduce aggregate demand as
workers have less income to spend on consumption. Production will fall as a
reaction, aggravating the depression. Labor-saving technical improvements thus
deepen business cycle ﬂuctuations (Lederer 1938, p. 250).
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Some appraisals
The extensions to Lederer’s business cycle explanation presented in this section
modify his original contribution substantially. The core insight remains
untouched though: cyclical ﬂuctuations are an integral part of the growth process
in a capitalist system. A separate analysis of either of them is impossible. This
also implies that business cycles cannot be understood as ﬂuctuations around a
growth trend. Rather, in a capitalist economy growth takes place in conjunction
with ﬂuctuations. Only a planned economy can avoid ﬂuctuations and still
advance.
Despite this continuity, changes in emphasis in Lederer’s consecutive contri-
butions to the analysis of cycles, crises, and growth are discernible. In 1925,
Lederer observes and analyzes the interconnection between growth and ﬂuctu-
ations in a somewhat uninvolved way. Suggestions for stabilizing the business
cycle are discussed against the background of the theoretical analysis. Most of
them are rejected. Lederer does not seem to perceive a particular urgency to
mitigate the eﬀects of cycles, although he clearly welcomes means to avoid
excesses, e.g., as side eﬀects of the institutionalization of a central banking
system. Both extensions to his 1925 business cycle explanation are prompted by
what Lederer perceives as recent changes in the capitalist economy. The increased
cartelization in industry and the predominance of labor-saving technical change
in the post World War I era aggravate business cycles. This adds a sense of
urgency to the analysis that is also highlighted by the shift in focus from the
eﬀects of cycles on output in his early work to the eﬀects on employment in his
later contributions.22
The workers made redundant by labor-saving technical change may initially
be absorbed into other industries during the upswing. Unemployment is aggra-
vated in the crisis and depression though. The eﬀects of rapid, labor-saving
technical change go beyond this: a loss in growth potential results as accumula-
tion lags behind the population development and leaves part of the workforce
unemployed. Although the long-term eﬀects of deepened business cycles are not
discussed in the context of cartelization, the issue could be raised there also:
does the extended depression due to the existence of cartels and trusts lead to
losses in terms of the level of the growth process, even though the economy
eventually returns to higher activity? In short, issues of path dependence are
introduced through the extensions Lederer makes to his business cycle theory.
The business cycle no longer just interrupts the growth process; the cause and
initial impulse of the cycle, the course, and extent of the depression become
crucial for future development.
In 1925 issues of distribution and growth were the center of attention. Dickler
(1981, p. 296) therefore claims Lederer as a precursor of Kalecki and Kaldor. In
Lederer (1925) the disproportional development of income shares alone could
be responsible for endogenous business cycles. As argued above, Lederer focuses
22Going beyond economic arguments, Lederer’s sense of the overall importance of the issues raised
by technical change is highlighted in his discussion of the links between the changes in production
technology, social organization, and politics as exempliﬁed in his 1934 article, where the emergence
of fascist governments is discussed (Lederer 1934, p. 556).
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on changes in the composition of demand to explain boom and recession. In his
later contributions Lederer concentrates on supply side issues. This is especially
true for the analysis of labor-saving technical change, where Lederer traces the
eﬀects of technical progress on the development of production capacity and
employment.
In this light, the classiﬁcation of Lederer as underconsumption theorist can
be discussed. In Prosperity and Depression (1937/1963, p. 118) Gottfried Haberler
lists Lederer, together with John A. Hobson, William T. Foster, and Waddill
Catchings, as authors ‘‘who have done most in recent times to re-state and
propagate the under-consumption theory in a scientiﬁc way.’’ Authors in the
history of economic thought, if they mention Lederer at all, often present him
in the context of underconsumption explanations of the cycle (e.g., Kruse 1959,
p. 277; Pribram 1981, p. 377).
Many of the topics concerning underconsumptionists make their appearance
in Lederer’s writings. This is especially true for his 1925 contribution, wherein
Lederer is interested in issues of growth and distribution: the disproportional
development of income shares in the upswing and boom lead to an expansion
of output capacity that is not matched by the increase in demand. The growth
path is not sustainable: a crisis follows. This is a traditional underconsumptionist
line of thought where rising income shares of capitalists lead to ‘‘over’’-saving
and ‘‘over’’-production. A disequilibrium between aggregate supply and demand
for consumer goods results. But unlike underconsumptionists, Lederer considers
the crisis as necessary to bring about the adjustments in the production sphere.
Therefore, Lederer rejects the possibility of preventing a crisis by driving up
aggregate demand for ﬁnal products. Lederer also explicitly rejects the ‘‘popular
view’’ that consumption increases the wealth of an economy by increasing
circulation. He points out that ‘‘The danger of consumption expenditure being
too large is usually bigger than the danger of it being too small’’ (Lederer 1925,
p. 379, n. 1).23 Savings are desirable as they allow accumulation and growth, a
classical concern separating Lederer from underconsumptionists. Lederer does
not suggest measures that change the income distribution so as to increase
consumption expenditure and reduce savings. What he perceives as central are
the decisions over how and where to invest.
The emphasis on the supply side, rather than underconsumptionists’ concerns
with demand-side issues, is reinforced in Lederer’s subsequent contributions to
business cycle analysis. In 1927 he argues that cartels and trusts lead to stronger
ﬂuctuations because they introduce additional distortions in the allocation of
savings and hinder adjustment processes. Again, in his discussion of the eﬀects
of technical progress in 1931 and 1938, Lederer concentrates on the supply side.
As in his earlier writings, it is not the volume of savings and investment per se
that causes problems but the decisions on how and where to invest are crucial:
23Nevertheless examples of ‘‘crude’’ underconsumption arguments can also be found in Lederer.
For example, in his discussion of credit as a means to transfer savings Lederer (1925, p. 379) argues
that the possibility of earning interest encourages groups to save who so far had no incentive to do
so. This could lead to a discrepancy between production and consumption if everybody reduced
consumption and productive capacity were increased by the additional savings. This could lead to
excess supply of consumer goods and a collapse of their prices.
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they determine the capital intensity of production and the organic composition
of capital. The unemployment and decline in growth potential that Lederer
analyzes now results from a shift towards more capital-intensive production
techniques. Since the economy’s savings limit the capital available workers cannot
be employed due to a lack in corresponding capital equipment. This is far
removed from traditional underconsumptionist concerns. Although technical
change also ﬁgured in these arguments, the issues raised are completely diﬀerent:
the most important eﬀect of technical change is seen in the increase in the supply
of ﬁnal goods because technical progress increases the output a given amount of
savings can produce. Technical progress thus aggravates disequilibria between
aggregate supply and demand for ﬁnal goods. To sum up, although Lederer shares
a number of topics with underconsumptionists, his approach and treatment of
them is not underconsumptionist.
To return to the evolution of Lederer’s thinking on cycles, crises, and growth,
attention should be given to the changes in his economic policy conclusions that
result from the modiﬁcations to his original argument. In 1925 the
disproportionalities that are behind cyclical developments result from coordina-
tion failures. Macroeconomic planning would avoid them altogether. But Lederer
perceives solutions to mitigate cycles also within a purely capitalist economy: a
central banking system or an organized banking sector would have the informa-
tion at its disposal to prevent disproportionalities by adequate credit granting.
The discussion of the eﬀects of cartels on business cycles leads Lederer to reject
this possibility of controling business cycles, as the investments by cartels and
trusts are ﬁnanced out of their high proﬁts and thus do not depend on bank
credit. Inﬂuencing income distribution, which he now sees as a means to dampen
the eﬀects of the cycle, would require interventionist policies. As already argued
in 1925, only a planned economy can escape business cycles altogether and
still grow.
Even though Lederer in 1938 abstains from the pointed conclusions of the
1931 version of Technical Progress and Unemployment, the same results must be
reached by the reader: labor-saving technical change has grave eﬀects in a market
economy. A smooth and fast reintegration of workers as suggested by traditional
economic analysis is unlikely. Instead, the absorption will be a long drawn-out
process despite wage and price adjustments. If unemployment and the reduction
in growth potential is to be avoided, technical change must be curbed. Even
though it is not spelled out this brings us back to some form of macroeconomic
planning.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections we followed the development of Lederer’s business
cycle analysis. In his ﬁrst contribution, the concern with aggregate demand
conditions that follow from the income distribution dominates. This brings
Lederer close to traditional underconsumption arguments. The distribution
between proﬁts and wages determines savings, and savings in turn determine the
composition of aggregate demand and thus allocation. During the business
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cycle, diﬀerent income types grow disproportionally, inducing unsustainable
investments. A credit cycle accompanies the ﬂuctuations and allows prices to rise
in the upswing and forces them down in the recession. Fixed incomes act as
stabilizers in the cycle.
The business cycle is inseparable from growth and development in a capitalist
economy. This insight is already present in Lederer’s early work but becomes
more prominent in his later contributions, especially in his analysis of labor-
saving technical change. Technical progress is crucial in its eﬀects on the path of
capital accumulation, employment capacity, and output. Lederer focuses on
conditions that prevent full employment of labor and thus lead to reduced
growth potential. This is far removed from traditional underconsumptionist
concerns. The policy implications of Lederer’s argument make that clear. As
supply side conditions are at the heart of the unemployment problem, it cannot
be overcome by demand side measures. Increasing eﬀective demand would not
allow the absorption of workers into the production process if accumulation lags
behind the growth of the labor supply after technical progress has augmented
the organic composition of capital. Therefore, Lederer sees measures of macro-
economic planning to inﬂuence the supply side directly as the only way to control
the eﬀects of rapid technical progress.
Lederer’s business-cycle analysis is remarkable from a methodological point
of view. Lederer brings a diverse heritage of theoretical and methodological
approaches into his analysis. He is interested in a genuinely dynamic theory of
processes of development and growth, of which ﬂuctuations are an integral part.
He builds on an analysis of the circular ﬂows of goods and income streams in
the economy inspired by Marx’s reproduction schemes. But Lederer also includes
insights and concepts developed in the framework of equilibrium analysis such
as the concept of additional credit or forced savings. In his 1925 and 1927
contributions, Lederer relies on verbal analysis and argument. Although this
method still dominates his 1931b/1938 work, he now also uses numerical
examples in his reasoning. He constructs cases to follow the development of his
model economy through several periods. The underlying assumptions are modi-
ﬁed in steps, thus broadening the scope of the analysis. Qualiﬁcations are
introduced. This, especially, makes his 1938 contribution a demanding read and
contrasts with contemporary theoretical work, where a diﬀerent style of analyzing
clear cut—and simpliﬁed—theoretical problems is being developed. Lederer does
not make the step to generalized formal models, to the modern style of economic
theory that was beginning to take hold of the economics profession in Lederer’s
lifetime. This has to be seen in the context of the kind of problems that Lederer
addresses. Traverse analysis does not avail itself to generalized argument to the
same extent as equilibrium economics; the ventures of others in this ﬁeld,
especially of Lo¨we and Hicks, prove this point.
Lederer, although himself not an empirical economist, is keenly interested in
the analysis of the phenomena of the business cycle done by his contemporaries.
As much in 1925 as in 1938, he presents statistical material to illustrate the
problems posed by recent developments and to discuss his theoretical argument.
This attempt at integrating deductive theoretical analysis and empirical work
may go back to Lederer’s student days where he was exposed as much to the
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‘‘theoretical’’ Austrian as to the ‘‘empirical’’ historical school. Lederer (1925,
p. 355) claims that the analysis of economic history is impossible without theory;
at the same time his theoretical argument is inspired by and confronted with
data.24 Therefore, what Lo¨we (1933, p. 158) praises as a ‘‘new alliance between
empirical and theoretical analysis’’ can be found in Lederer’s work. His contri-
butions are intriguing because of their topical nature. Lederer is a commentator
on contemporary issues, applying rigorous theoretical argument to the pressing
problems of his day.
My argument has presented Lederer’s work as fascinating. Theoretically, it is
rich in providing a synthesis of diﬀerent traditions. Linking theoretical with
institutional and empirical analysis makes it methodologically interesting. Lederer
was an acclaimed economist in his day. The question thus arises why Lederer and
his work are known to few economists today. The following considerations give
hints of an answer.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 884) describes Lederer as ‘‘the leading academic socialist
of Germany in the 1920’s.’’ His reputation is reﬂected in the prestigious positions
he held. A professor at the University of Heidelberg since 1918, he declined
oﬀers from the Universities of Leipzig and Frankfurt and it was not until 1931
when he accepted an oﬀer—from the University of Berlin.25 ‘‘The importance
that he had as an economist in the Weimar Republic is not only documented by
the appointment to this most important of all economics chairs in Germany, but
also by his work for the Archiv fu¨r Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik’’ (Esslinger
1999, p. 355). This journal, which he edited for several years, was a platform for
the reform-oriented economists during the Weimar years but was also open to
other traditions (Hagemann 2000, p. 43). Furthermore, Lederer played an active
role in the Verein fu¨r Sozialpolitik as several of the published protocols of the
yearly meetings show.26 With the Nazi’s assumption of power in 1933, Lederer
left Germany. After a short stay in Great Britain he emigrated to the United
States. Invited to the New School for Social Research by Alvin Johnson, he
became the ﬁrst dean of the University in Exile and helped to gather a
distinguished group of social scientists.
Although Lederer was able to continue his work at an academic institution
with little interruption, he was confronted with extraordinary change. A leading
economist at the top university in Germany, he came to an institution ‘‘under
construction’’ in the United States. He carried much of the construction work
himself (see Krohn 1993, pp. 64–66 for details), not least as editor of the newly
founded journal Social Research (Esslinger 1999, p. 355). Attracting academically
oriented students to the New School was hampered in the early years as the
24Diebolt (1997, p. 43) describes it as a ‘‘paradoxical situation’’ when Lederer’s deductive Austrian
tradition is confronted with empirical business cycle analysis. There is no hint, though, that Lederer
himself would have found that paradoxical.
25Paul A. Baran (professor at Stanford University, 1949–1964) was the only student who ﬁnished
a doctoral thesis with Lederer during his short tenure in Berlin (Hagemann and Krohn 1999,
pp. 25–26).
26 In Janssen’s discussion of the conﬂict between historical school and theoretical economists in the
Verein fu¨r Sozialpolitik in the second half of the 1920s, Lederer ﬁgures as one of the few established
economists in the group of theoreticians (Janssen 1998, pp. 26–38).
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Graduate Faculty of the New School received degree-granting rights only in
1941 (Mongiovi 1997, p. 388), two years after Lederer’s premature death.
Therefore, Lederer’s inﬂuence via New School students in the United States was
limited.
Besides the dramatic eﬀects of emigration on Lederer’s life and work, changes
in economics itself help explain why his thinking had not more impact and
longer-term following. The eﬀects of Keynes’s The General Theory and the
Keynesian revolution have to be considered here. The framework of analysis that
Keynes introduced redeﬁned macroeconomic analysis. A shift of interest from
long-term issues of cycles and growth to a short-term analysis of macroeconomic
shocks dominated the years immediately after the publication of The General
Theory. Even though problems of growth are addressed in Harrod’s and Domar’s
work soon after, the perspective on these issues had changed. An almost complete
break with pre-Keynesian analysis took place, pushing long-standing traditions
in monetary and real analysis into the background. Lederer and others at the
New School gave The General Theory a ‘‘lukewarm’’ reception (Mongiovi 1997,
p. 393). In Technical Progress and Unemployment, Lederer continued to use the
tools he had developed from foundations in Austrian, Marxian, and neoclassical
theory. We can only speculate on how Lederer would have reacted to an academic
environment taken over by the ‘‘New Economics.’’ Many of the issues he had
raised, especially in his earlier work, make their appearance in Keynesian
analysis. But we do not know whether Lederer would have eventually found the
Keynesian framework adequate to present his own concerns as, e.g., Hansen can
be understood as doing (Mehrling 1997, pp. 130–36; pp. 140–46).
The changes in the economics profession in the postwar era go beyond this.
Keynesian macroeconomics on the one hand, and rational choice and general
equilibrium analysis on the other, led to a mainstream in economics, the
establishment of a fairly uniﬁed approach as compared to the diversity of the
preceding decades. Theory redeﬁned as formal analysis and empirical study
delimited as econometrics brought forward a new type of economist. Economists
educated in this era no longer needed to be acquainted with diﬀerent traditions
in economic analysis to succeed, whereas this was still a matter of course for the
generation of their teachers. Without a broad background in economic theories
it is diﬃcult to understand Lederer’s contributions and impossible to advance
his lines of thought. Later attempts to do so found limited attention for the
same reasons (e.g., the contributions to the volume on technical progress and
unemployment edited by Hagemann and Kalmbach in 1983).
In sum: the forced emigration and the changes in Lederer’s work environment
that came with it cut Lederer from his established position of inﬂuence and
standing. Whereas the tradition he stood for in the Weimar Republic was
truncated by Nazi empowerment, the circumstances and the few years he had
left in the United States did not allow him to rebuild a similar sphere of inﬂuence
in his new environment. The predominance of mainstream economics that
developed in the postwar years led to a breach with longstanding traditions in
economic analysis that could not be ﬁtted into the new framework. Lederer’s
analysis, together with much of the pre-Keynesian cycle and growth analysis,
suﬀered that fate. Part of the aim of this paper is, therefore, to draw attention to
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Lederer’s fascinating and diﬀerentiated work. His contributions were topical in
the sense that he aimed at explaining contemporary problems and suggesting
adequate policies to deal with them. His explanation of unemployment stressing
technological factors deserves special attention, as these issues are by no means
theoretically solved in a satisfactory way to this day.
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